


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DDI #1022-82
11 February 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director

FROM : Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director for Intelligence

SUBJECT : Dissemination of Intelligence Information

1. This memorandum is in response to your note of 1 February 1982.
2. Review of the case of unauthorized disclosure of intelligence information [redacted] has led us to reduce the details contained in articles published in the Scientific and Weapons Daily Review.

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3. This publication is cabled from this building in several telegraphic versions, depending on classification and subject matter. Altogether, it goes to about 100 addressees. Contrary to the impression left in [redacted] memorandum, it does not receive a dissemination of 4,000 copies. That is absurd. There are a total of 4,000 to 5,000 individuals at the recipient organizations who are cleared for one or more versions of the cable. We have no more control over how many of those people actually read the cable than DDO has over an "exclusive for" sensitive clandestine report or DDS&T has over documents referring to one of its highly sensitive programs. As the Office of Security knows, the control problem in institutions receiving sensitive CIA information is beyond our reach except via the DCI's broad authorities and where we can pinpoint misuse.

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4. Each of the recipients of the Scientific and Weapons Daily Review has a demonstrable need to know and we, therefore, have not reduced the number of addressees or further limited distribution. To our knowledge, this is the only leak of classified information to date which might be directly traced to this publication. The Office of Security is currently pursuing another lead however -- a former government employee who had access to the intelligence information while still with the government. With respect to the overall dissemination problem, as you are aware three years ago on Presidential Directive the distribution list of the National Intelligence Daily was severely pared and its total external distribution is about 150. This includes all the different NFIB agencies as well as the policy agencies. This is a far cry from the total count of 458 offered by the Office of Security, which includes internal CIA distribution. I realize from a security standpoint total distribution must be considered, but I believe it is misleading to 1) not distinguish between actual

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dissemination and potential readership by cleared personnel and 2) not to distinguish for the Director the distinction between internal and external distribution.

5. In addition to reducing the amount of detail in the Scientific and Weapons Daily Review, we are considering other ways to tighten security in our publications and would welcome suggestions. By the same token, we need to inform our legitimate readership and, particularly on controversial issues, must make a persuasive case with the evidence we have. Indeed, one of my principal problems with too much DDI analysis is that there is no reference to evidence or sources so that the reader is left to guess which statements are supported by fact or evidence and which are simply a reflection of what we think or believe.

6. I hope that recent expressions of concern about security and steps taken to tighten security at the highest levels will strengthen discipline at lower levels and have a chilling effect on potential leakers. At the same time we will work to insure that our analysis carefully protects sources and methods and especially sensitive information in particular.




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Robert M. Gates

Attachment:
As StatedDistribution:
Original - Addressee

- 1 - ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~
- 1 - DDI
- 1 - ADDI
- 1 - DDI Action Officer
- 1 - DDI Registry
- 1 - C/MASS
- 1 - C/PPRG
- 1 - PPRG Subject File
- 1 - PPRG Chrono File

DDI:MASS:PPRG:  (8Feb82)

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